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ERIE DENIED: HOW FEDERAL COURTS DECIDE
INSURANCE COVERAGE CASES DIFFERENTLY AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
JOHN L. WATKINS1
***
Application of the Erie doctrine requires that federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction apply substantive state law consistent with
the state’s highest court as a matter of federalism and to discourage forum
shopping. This Article analyzes the reality, however, that federal courts
decide important unsettled questions of state law differently than state
courts, which undermines these two fundamental underpinnings of the Erie
doctrine. Further, this Article demonstrates, through various examples,
how these incorrect “Erie guesses” can have profound practical
implications in the insurance context due to the standard use of form
contracts for drafting insurance policies. As a result, litigants battle
fiercely over the judicial forum, as federal courts are perceived,
particularly by insurers, to decide procedural and substantive issues of
state law differently than state courts.
Considering that the abolishment of diversity jurisdiction is highly
improbable, this Article argues that federal courts should adopt clear,
uniform standards that favor the liberal use of certification of unsettled
questions of state law to the state’s highest court. A constitutionally
consistent approach to certification would promote the principles of
federalism that underlie the Erie doctrine, and would render moot the less
productive question of why federal courts decide the issues differently.
***
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Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction decide cases
differently than state courts despite their obligation under the Erie doctrine2
to apply substantive law in the same manner as the state courts. Federal
courts periodically make incorrect “Erie guesses” of unsettled questions of
state law as later determined by the state’s highest court.3 In many
instances, however, the state’s highest court will not have the opportunity
to correct the error because the issue never reaches it.
Insurance coverage litigation provides a particularly important
subject for studying this phenomenon for several reasons. First, federal
courts are routinely called on to decide coverage questions, so there is a
large body of case law to examine. Second, supreme courts from different
states often reach diametrically different conclusions in deciding important
coverage issues based on identical insurance policy language.4 The
2

See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (mandating
that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive
law).
3
The term “Erie guess” (referring to a federal court’s deciding of unsettled
questions of state law) appears to have originated with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which stated in Grey v. Hayes-Sammons Chemical
Co., 310 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1962), that Erie required it to “make an Erie,
educated guess” as to Mississippi law. “Erie guess” is now used widely in the
literature.
4
For example, state courts are about equally divided on whether a
construction defect resulting from negligent construction constitutes an
“occurrence” under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Compare Am.
Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Hathaway Dev. Co., 707 S.E.2d 369, 372 (Ga.
2011) (defective construction may constitute an “occurrence”), with Essex Ins. Co.
v. Holder, 261 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Ark. 2008) (defective construction not an
“occurrence”). State courts are also divided about equally on whether the “sudden
and accidental” pollution exclusion applies to bar coverage for the unintended
release of pollutants over a long period of time. Compare Claussen v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688–89 (Ga. 1989) (finding “sudden” does not
necessarily mean “abrupt” and is reasonably interpreted to mean “unexpected” and
hence holding coverage not excluded for discharge over extended period of time),
with Dutton-Lainson Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 716 N.W.2d 87, 97–100 (Neb. 2006)
(deciding an event occurring over a period of time is not “sudden” and rejecting
Claussen). The cases on this contentious issue are collected in Dutton-Lainson.
Similarly, the courts are sharply split on whether the “absolute pollution exclusion”
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potential for such divergence increases the possibility of an erroneous
guess when a federal court decides an unsettled coverage question because
of the likelihood of conflicting persuasive precedents from other
jurisdictions. Third, the consequences of an incorrect Erie guess in
coverage cases can have profound practical implications beyond the
immediate case because insurance policies are typically written on common
forms. A mistaken determination in one case may thus be repeated many
times over in being applied as persuasive precedent to other claims. This is
an important consideration.
This Article will demonstrate that federal courts have often guessed
incorrectly in deciding important coverage issues. Moreover, the anecdotal
view that insurers favor federal courts over state courts for both procedural
and substantive reasons is supported by available survey and statistical
evidence. The result is that federal courts often dispense—and are
perceived to dispense—a different brand of justice than state courts.
The Article next examines how the practice of deciding unsettled
coverage issues undermines the Erie doctrine. Erie has two fundamental
underpinnings: First, the case firmly established that a state’s highest court
has the right to determine state law.5 Second, Erie was meant to discourage
precludes claims not involving environmental pollutants. Compare Reed v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 667 S.E.2d 90, 92 (Ga. 2008) (showing a claim arising from
accidental release of carbon monoxide at rental house precluded by absolute
pollution exclusion even though it did not involve environmental pollution), with
Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 82 (Ill. 1997) (holding a claim
arising from accidental release of carbon monoxide not precluded by absolute
pollution exclusion, which must be read in the context of its purpose of limiting
coverage for environmental contamination).
5
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 822 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of
the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.”).
Erie was decided on constitutional grounds, and this aspect of the decision, and
others, have provoked a plethora of articles and debate. See, e.g., 17A JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 124App.03 (Daniel R. Coquillette
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007) (citing numerous articles). With that said, Erie’s reliance
on constitutional grounds is explicit and as prominent scholars have noted: “In the
end . . . Erie must be accepted as a constitutional decision.” 19 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4505 (2d ed. Supp. 2013). The main volume of Wright, Miller, and
Cooper notes Erie’s explicit reliance on the Constitution and contains an extensive
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forum shopping between the federal and state courts.6 When federal courts
decide unsettled questions of state law, they intrude on the first principle.
And when they decide—or even when they are perceived to decide—those
questions differently than the state courts, they undermine the second.
Finally, the Article examines possible solutions. Almost all states
now have statutes allowing federal appellate courts (and sometimes district
courts) to certify unsettled questions of state law to a state’s highest court
for decision.
Although the United States Supreme Court has
enthusiastically endorsed certification on a number of occasions, the use of
the certification procedure by the lower federal courts is haphazard. The
Supreme Court has never established standards for certification, and, left to
their own devices, the federal appellate courts have espoused a crazy quilt
of certification standards, ranging from liberally granting certification to
using it sparingly. The solution is straight-forward: The federal courts
should adopt uniform standards favoring the liberal use of certification of
unsettled questions of state law to a state’s highest court.
II.

FEDERAL COURTS MAKE INCORRECT ERIE GUESSES

Federal courts have made many incorrect Erie guesses, particularly
in insurance coverage cases. This is not meant to be a blanket criticism of
collection of authorities. See generally Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17 (2013) (containing a
lengthy examination of Erie, its defenders and detractors). This Article will not
wade into these controversies. The fundamental principle of Erie, that a state’s
highest court has the final say on issues of state law, is so well-established that it
cannot be seriously questioned. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,
226 (1991) (“Erie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the
substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional
directive to the contrary.”).
6
See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964) (quoting Guar. Trust
Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“The nub of the policy that
underlies [Erie] is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a nonresident litigant in a federal court instead of in a state court a block away, should
not lead to a substantially different result.”); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 468 (1965) (“[T]he twin aims of the Erie rule: [are the] discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”); Salve
Regina, 499 U.S. at 234 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468) (explaining that the twin
aims of Erie are avoiding the inequitable administration of justice and forum
shopping).
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the federal judiciary, nor is it meant to suggest that federal courts routinely
make incorrect determinations of state law. Nevertheless, as some federal
judges have candidly acknowledged, mistakes have been made. In the
insurance context, the incorrect guess is particularly likely to be amplified
due to the use of form contracts, making it more likely for the mistake to be
repeated as precedent.
A.

GENERALLY

A number of distinguished jurists have recognized that incorrect
Erie guesses have plagued the federal judiciary for years in many different
substantive areas of the law. In 1964, Judge Brown of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that his court’s record in
predicting state law was terrible, particularly regarding Florida law:
Within the very recent past, both Texas and Alabama have
overruled decisions of this Court, and the score in Florida
cases is little short of staggering.
In similar, but
subsequent, cases, the Florida Courts have expressly
repudiated our holdings in a number of cases. And now
that we have this remarkable facility of certification, we
have not yet “guessed right” on a single case.7
Writing twenty-eight years later, Judge Sloviter of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that the predictions had not
improved:
[T]he state courts have found fault with a not insignificant
number of past “Erie guesses” made by the Third Circuit
and our district courts. Despite our best efforts to predict
the future thinking of the state supreme courts within our
jurisdiction on the basis of all of the available data, we
have guessed wrong on questions of the breadth of
arbitration clauses in automobile insurance policies (we
7

United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 1964)
(Brown, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416
U.S. 386, 390 n.6 (1974) (noting former Fifth Circuit’s tendency to grant
certification to state courts because of errors in predicting state law).
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predicted they would not extend to disputes over the
entitlement to coverage, but they do), the availability of
loss of consortium damages for unmarried cohabitants (we
predicted they would be available, but they are not), the
“unreasonably dangerous” standard in products liability
cases (we predicted the Restatement would not apply, but it
does), and the applicability of the “discovery rule” to
wrongful death and survival actions (we predicted it would
toll the statute of limitations, but it does not). And this list
is by no means exhaustive.
It is not that Third Circuit judges are particularly poor
prognosticators. All of the circuits have similar problems
in predicting state law accurately.8
As shown herein, there is no indication that the federal courts have gotten
better in making predictions since Judge Sloviter’s article.
B.

INSURANCE COVERAGE CASES

The federal courts have made incorrect Erie guesses in many
insurance coverage cases. Even worse, these mistakes have often been on
important recurring issues regarding the interpretation of common
insurance policy provisions.
1. Environmental Response Costs as “Damages”
One of the more contentious insurance coverage issues of the
1980s and 1990s was whether environmental response costs such as
cleanup costs and monitoring costs imposed under the federal
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability Act
(CERCLA) were covered as “damages” under commercial general liability
policies (“CGL”).
In Continental Insurance Co. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. (“NEPACCO”), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit made an Erie guess under Missouri law

8

Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through
the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1679–80 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
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and held that response costs were not “damages.”9 The NEPACCO court
reasoned that “damages” should be defined “in the insurance context”
rather than “outside the insurance context,” and that in the “insurance
context” they were not considered “damages.”10 Nine years later, in
Farmland Industries, Inc. v. Republic Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of
Missouri held that response costs were “damages” under commercial
general liability and other policies issued by the insurers and thus
covered.11 The Farmland court squarely rejected the Eighth Circuit’s guess:
The NEPACCO court misconstrues and circumvents
Missouri law. The cases upon which the NEPACCO court
relies for the proposition that “damages” distinguishes
between claims at law and claims at equity are not
persuasive. The cases do not determine the ordinary
meaning of “damages” as required by Missouri law.
Furthermore, no authority allows this Court to define
words “in the insurance context.” To give words in an
insurance contract a technical meaning simply by reading
them “in the insurance context,” would render meaningless
our law's requirement that words be given their ordinary
meaning unless a technical meaning is plainly intended.12
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that environmental response
costs were recoverable “as damages” under a CGL policy in Bausch &
Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.13 In Bausch & Lomb, the court
specifically disavowed an earlier “Erie guess” to the contrary by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Armco, Inc.14 The Bausch & Lomb court stated:

9

See Cont’l Ins. Cos. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 987 (8th Cir.
1991) (en banc).
10
Id. at 985.
11
Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 512 (Mo.
1997).
12
Id. at 510.
13
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1021, 1037 (Md.
1993).
14
See generally Md. Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir.1987).
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To the extent it suggests that the term “damages” imports a
distinctively legal meaning in insurance matters, Armco
misperceives the law of Maryland. As discussed earlier,
we accord to words their usual and accepted signification.
“Damages” in common usage means the reparation in
money for a detriment or injury sustained. The reasonably
prudent layperson does not cut nice distinctions between
the remedies offered at law and in equity. Absent an
express provision in the document itself, insurance policyholders surely do not anticipate that coverage will depend
on the mode of relief, i.e. a cash payment rather than an
injunction, sought by an injured party. Policy-holders will,
instead, reasonably infer that the insurer’s pledge to pay
damages will apply generally to compensatory outlays of
various kinds, including expenditures made to comply with
administrative orders or formal injunctions.15
In its analysis, the court criticized the Fourth Circuit for overlooking case
law establishing that insurance policies must be interpreted in accordance
with the expectations of a reasonably prudent layperson.16
The Bausch & Lomb opinion noted the approach of many federal
courts differed from the views of state courts on the recovery of
environmental response costs as “damages” under CGL policies:
In confronting the legal issues present in the instant case,
the majority of state appellate courts have concluded that
the standard insuring language covers environmental
response costs. They have construed the term “damages”
to reach both monetary compensation to government
agencies or aggrieved third parties and the expense of
complying with environmental injunctions. The federal
courts divide more or less evenly on the question.17

15

Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 625 A.2d at 1032–33.
Id. at 1032 n.6. But despite this aspect of the court’s decision, it ultimately
found in favor of the insurer, and found that the absence of third party property
damage meant there was no coverage under the facts of the case. Id. at 1036.
17
Id. at 1030 (citations omitted).
16
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This observation suggests there have been additional incorrect Erie guesses
on this recurring issue.
2. Negligent Construction as an “Occurrence”
One of the most hotly contested issues in insurance coverage
litigation in the past several years is whether negligently performed
construction can constitute an “occurrence” under a CGL policy. Federal
courts have made incorrect Erie guesses on this important issue. In
Georgia, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
issued a series of decisions holding that negligently performed construction
could not constitute an occurrence. The first decision was Owners
Insurance Co. v. James, which held that negligent installation of synthetic
stucco could not be an occurrence because “the insurance policies at issue
in this case provide coverage for injury resulting from accidental acts, but
not for an injury accidentally caused by intentional acts.”18 This
distinction—difficult even to comprehend—was embraced in other federal
decisions.19 One federal judge expressed dismay regarding this approach,
although he followed it, noting that the precedent “may create an awkward
environment” for parties seeking to insure risks because “almost every
conceivable accident involves some intentional action at some point in the
chain of causation.”20
When the issue reached the Supreme Court of Georgia, the court
not only held that negligent construction could be an occurrence, but it also
expressly rejected the reasoning of the federal cases: “[W]e reject out of
18

See Owners Ins. Co. v. James, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
Owners Ins. Co. v. Chadd’s Lake Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 1:03-cv2050-WSD (N.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 2004) (“Chadd’s Lake I”); Owners Ins. Co. v.
Chadd’s Lake Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 1:005-cv-00475-JOF, 2006 WL
1553888, at *4 (N.D. Ga. May 30, 2006) (“Chadd’s Lake II”); Travelers Indem.
Co. of Conn. v. Douglasville Dev., LLC, No. 1:07-cv-0410-JOW, 2008 WL
4372004, at *8–9 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2008); Hathaway Dev. Co., Inc. v. Ill. Union
Ins. Co., No. 07-00118-CV-MHS-1, 2008 WL 1773307, at *8–9 (11th Cir. Apr.
18, 2008).
20
Douglasville Dev., LLC, 2008 WL 4372004, at *9 (Forrester, J.). It is
somewhat ironic that the court stated that “every conceivable accident involves
some intentional action” given that the basic express definition of “occurrence” in
a CGL policy is an “accident.”
19
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hand the assertion that the acts . . . could not be deemed an occurrence or
accident under the CGL policy because they were performed intentionally.
‘[A] deliberate act, performed negligently, is an accident if the effect is not
the intended or expected result . . . .’”21
Similarly, in Architex Association, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.
the Supreme Court of Mississippi also held that negligent construction
performed by a subcontractor can constitute an “occurrence” under a CGL
policy.22 The court held that a contrary Erie guess by the Fifth Circuit in
ACS Construction Co., Inc. v. CGU23 was “inconsistent with Mississippi
law.”24
3. Application of the “Sudden and Accidental” Exception
to the Pollution Exclusion in CGL policies
One of the most frequently and persistently litigated insurance
coverage issues from the 1980s to today is the interpretation of the
pollution exclusion in CGL policies with an exception for releases that are
“sudden and accidental.” This version of the pollution exclusion, which
was first utilized in 1973, excludes coverage for bodily injury or property
damage “arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke,
21

See Am. Empire Surplus Lines v. Hathaway Dev. Co., 707 S.E.2d 369, 372
(Ga. 2011) (quoting Lamar Homes v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.2d 1, 16
(Tex. 2007)). See J. Watkins, American Empire Surplus Lines v. Hathaway Dev.
Co.: An Important Occurrence in Georgia Insurance Law, 17 GA. BAR J. 10
(2011), for a more thorough discussion of this issue.
22
Architex Ass’n, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 27 So.3d 1148, 1162 (Miss.
2010).
23
ACS Constr. Co., Inc. of Miss. V. CGU, 332 F.3d 885, 888-892 (5th Cir.
2003).
24
Architex Ass’n, Inc., 27 So.2d at 1162. Similarly, in Lamar Homes, Inc. v.
Mid-Continent Casualty Co., the Supreme Court of Texas decided that negligent
construction could constitute an occurrence. Lamar Homes was decided on
certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
after the federal district court had made an incorrect Erie guess. Lamar Homes,
Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758–60 (W.D. Tex. 2004),
vacated, 501 F.3d 435 (5th Cir. 2007). There was, however, Fifth Circuit authority
consistent with the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Lamar Homes. See
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grapevine Excavation Inc., 197 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir.
1999).
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vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon the land,
the atmosphere or any water course or body of water.” However, the
policy also contains an exception to the exclusion that potentially restores
coverage. Specifically, the exclusion “does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.”25
Considerable litigation has focused on the meaning of the “sudden
and accidental” exception that restores coverage. Some courts have held
that “sudden and accidental” means that the discharge must have been
abrupt, and that “sudden” necessarily implies a temporal requirement.
Hence, under this analysis, a discharge or release over a long period of time
would be excluded. Other courts, in roughly equal numbers, have held that
“sudden” is ambiguous and can reasonably be interpreted to mean
“unexpected.” Under this interpretation, liabilities from unexpected longterm discharges or releases are not excluded. Which approach a court takes
is significant, because it essentially means the difference between coverage
and no coverage for expensive environmental liabilities.
Not surprisingly, federal courts have made incorrect Erie guesses
on this issue. In Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that a
“New Mexico court would likely honor the plain meaning of the word
‘sudden’ and conclude that the term encompasses a temporal component,
and thus that pollution must occur quickly or abruptly before the exemption
will apply.”26 In United Nuclear Corp. v. Allstate Insurance Co., the
Supreme Court of New Mexico rejected the reasoning of Mesa Oil,
specifically disagreeing with the Tenth Circuit’s observation that the
“trend” was to find a temporal requirement in addition to its analysis of the
policy language.27 Thus, “Mesa Oil’s holding that ‘sudden’ clearly means
‘abrupt’ was premised on two assumptions we view to be erroneous . . . .”28
25

DANIEL P. HALE, CAMBRIDGE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY SPECIAL REPORT:
HOW ABSOLUTE IS THE ABSOLUTE POLLUTION EXCLUSION? 2 (2008), available at
http://cambridgeunderwriters.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/How-Absolute-isthe-Absolute-Pollution-Exclusion.pdf. This Article contains a good discussion of
the history of the pollution exclusion, including form language prepared by the
Insurance Services Office (“ISO”). The provision is also quoted in the cases
discussed in this subsection.
26
Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 123 F.3d 1333, 1340 (10th Cir. 1997).
27
United Nuclear Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 285 P.3d 644 (N.M. 2012).
28
Id. at 653.
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In Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia emphatically rejected
the argument that “sudden” was ambiguous: “Only in the minds of
hypercreative lawyers could the word ‘sudden’ be stripped of its essential
temporal attributes.”29 While not all courts have agreed in this regard,
recent decisions have recognized with increasing frequency that the
pollution exclusion does mean just what it says.”30 When the case reached
the Supreme Court of Georgia on certified question, however, the result
was different, as was the analysis: “But, on reflection one realizes that,
even in its popular usage, ‘sudden’ does not usually describe the duration
of an event, but rather its unexpectedness: a sudden storm, a sudden turn in
the road, sudden death. Even when used to describe the onset of an event,
the word has an elastic temporal connotation that varies with expectations .
. . .”31 Accordingly, the court concluded that environmental liabilities
resulting from long term exposures were not excluded.
4. Application of the “Absolute” Pollution Exclusion to
Non-Environmental Claims
Because many courts, particularly state courts, rejected the
insurance industry’s interpretation of the “sudden and accidental” pollution
exclusion, the industry adopted the “absolute” pollution exclusion in 1985.
This pollution exclusion, in a typical form, excludes claims for bodily
injury or property damage “arising out of actual or alleged or threatened
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants” and defines
“pollutants” to be “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, alkalis, chemicals and
waste.”32
Particularly because the definition of “pollutants” is so broadly
stated, insurers have, with some success, argued for the application of the
exclusion to bar coverage for risks unrelated to traditional environmental
29

Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1580 (S.D. Ga.
1987), rev’d, 888 F.2d 747 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
30
Id.
31
Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989).
Claussen illustrates the proper use of the certification procedure discussed at length
later in this article.
32
HALE, supra note 25, at 10.
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pollution, such as, for example, injuries or deaths in homes or other
buildings resulting from the release of carbon monoxide from improperly
maintained furnaces. Some courts, however, have read the exclusion
narrowly and confined its application to claims involving environmental
liabilities. Again, some federal courts have made incorrect Erie guesses on
this important and contentious issue.
In Essex Insurance Co. v. Tri-Town Corp., the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts predicted that
Massachusetts would find the absolute pollution exclusion unambiguous,
and held that the exclusion barred coverage for underlying claims for
personal injury resulting from the discharge of carbon monoxide from a
malfunctioning Zamboni machine at a hockey game.33 Three years later, in
Western Alliance Insurance Co. v. Gill, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reached the opposite conclusion and held that the absolute
pollution exclusion in a policy did not bar coverage for claims for bodily
injury sustained due to exposure to carbon monoxide while dining at a
restaurant because a reasonable insured would not anticipate exclusion
barred claims for non-environmental pollution.34
This pattern repeated itself in Ohio. In Longaberger Co. v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guarantee Co., the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, in the absence of Ohio Supreme Court authority, held that
the absolute pollution exclusion would bar coverage for claims for bodily
injury resulting from the discharge of carbon monoxide.35 Three years later,
in Andersen v. Highland House Co., the Ohio Supreme Court reached the
opposite conclusion, and held that the exclusion did not bar coverage for
death and bodily injury claims caused by the release of carbon monoxide.36
5. Other Recent Examples
There are other examples of federal courts making Erie guesses
regarding insurance issues, many of broad potential importance, that were
later disavowed by the state’s highest court. For example, the Mississippi
Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation and application of
33

Essex Ins. Co. v. Tri-Town Corp., 863 F. Supp. 38, 40–41 (D. Mass. 1994).
W. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997, 1000–01 (Mass. 1997).
35
Longaberger Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 595, 604 (S.D.
Ohio 1998), aff’d, 201 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 1999).
36
Anderson v. Highland House Co., 757 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ohio 2001).
34
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an “anticoncurrent condition clause” that, as applied by the Fifth Circuit,
precluded coverage for wind damage as well as water damage in Hurricane
Katrina cases.37
In other recent cases, state supreme courts have rejected federal
district court determinations in coverage cases upon certified question from
the federal Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court of Appeals of New York
held, contrary to the federal district court, that a contractual limitation
period in a fire insurance policy requiring an insured to bring suit within
two years from the date of “direct physical loss or damage” to recover
replacement cost was unreasonable and unenforceable where the damaged
property could not reasonably be replaced in that period.38 The Supreme
Court of Florida held, contrary to the federal district court, that a policy’s
advertising injury coverage applied to violations of Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.39 There are other examples of this trend.40 Although the
incorrect guesses were thus corrected through the certification process—as
this Article argues should be standard practice—the cases nevertheless
illustrate that federal courts continue to make incorrect determinations of
state law in coverage litigation.

37

Corban v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 20 So.2d 601, 616–18 (Miss. 2009).
Exec. Plaza, LLC v. Peerless Ins. Co., 5 N.E.3d 989, 992 (N.Y. 2014).
39
Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co., 29 So.3d 1000, 1008 (Fla. 2010); see 47 U.S.C.
§ 227 (2000).
40
E.g., Ewing Constr. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 420 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Tex.
2014) (holding, contrary to federal district court and initial panel determination of
the Fifth Circuit, that general contractor who agrees to perform its construction
work in a good and workmanlike manner, without more, does not “assume
liability” for damages so as to trigger the contractual liability exclusion in CGL
policy); Fin. Indus. Corp. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 285 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex.
2009) (holding, contrary to federal district court, that insurer must show prejudice
to deny payment on a claims made policy based on late notice given within the
policy period); Cornhusker Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kachman, 198 P.3d 505, 509–10
(Wash. 2008) (en banc) (holding, contrary to federal district court, that notice of
cancellation sent by certified mail that was never received did not satisfy state
statutory requirements for cancellation).
38
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PERCEIVED AND REAL BENEFITS OF FEDERAL COURTS
TO INSURERS

The cases in the preceding section suggest that in many instances a
federal venue favored the insurer. The substantive results support my own
experience that insurers strongly, as a general rule, favor federal court.41
This section will demonstrate that the available survey and statistical
evidence also supports this view.
When an insurance company is sued in state court, it has a strong
tendency to invoke removal jurisdiction to move the case to federal court, if
possible. The use of the removal process is significant. Approximately
eleven to twelve percent of private litigant cases arrive in federal court by
removal.42 Between 2007 and 2011, over 30,000 cases were removed
annually from state court to federal court, with 34,190 cases removed in
2011.43 But, the raw numbers may not tell the full story. Because of the
$75,000 jurisdictional threshold for removal,44 it is likely that the most
significant cases—at least from a monetary point of view—end up in
federal court.
41

Some quarters of academia reject such experiential evidence. That said, the
views of experienced practitioners should not be dismissed. In the words of
baseball great Yogi Berra (“Berra”): “In theory, there is no difference between
theory and practice. In practice, there is.” Yogi Berra Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/y/yogiberra141506.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2015). Berra also said: “You can observe a lot by just watching.” Yogi
Berra Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/y/
yogiberra125285.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
42
Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases
Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 388
(1992).
43
DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS Table C-8 (2013)
[hereinafter “Director’s Report”], available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/C08Sep13.pdf (reporting the
number of cases removed for 2012 and 2013 decreased slightly but remained
above 32,000).
44
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (providing that actions which could have been
brought in the original jurisdiction of federal courts are generally removable); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (matters between citizens of different states
“where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs” are within the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts).
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PROCEDURAL PREFERENCE FOR FEDERAL COURT

A detailed attorney survey by Neal Miller regarding the use of
removal jurisdiction revealed that defense counsel, including a large
proportion representing insurance companies, “almost uniformly favored
federal court judges (85.6%).”45 Miller’s findings regarding defense counsel
generally apply to insurers. An insurer may file a declaratory judgment
action and thus act as the plaintiff. However, the surveys in the Miller
study revealed that only 1.6% of plaintiff attorneys represented insurance
companies, while 30.7% of defense attorney’s represented insurance
companies.46 Accordingly, the survey results attributed to defense counsel
would overwhelmingly include the views of those representing insurers.
Forty-seven-and-nine-tenths percent (47.9%) of defense attorneys reported
that the availability of summary judgment rulings was an important factor
in choosing a federal forum.47 Further, when adjusted by experience in
federal court, the percentage became extremely significant: “Among those
defense attorneys who reported that over 50% of their practice occurred in
federal court, two-thirds (66.6%) said that federal court summary judgment
rules were a factor in forum selection, and 32.8% cited it as a ‘very strong’
reason for removal.”48
Although the Miller study was published in 1992, there is reason to
believe that defense counsel’s—and hence insurer counsel’s—preference
for federal court has increased in the intervening twenty-three years. In
1993, the Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which imposed new requirements limiting the
introduction of expert testimony in federal court.49 Further, the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly50 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal51 established more stringent pleading requirements, thus permitting

45

Miller, supra note 42, at 414.
Id. at 400 ex. 2.
47
Id. at 418.
48
Id. at 419.
49
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993); see also
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999).
50
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
51
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570).
46
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the dismissal of cases filed in federal court before the discovery process.52
These developments all favor the defense and provide additional procedural
tools that did not exist at the time of the Miller survey.
Federal court statistics from the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts back up the perceptions that defense counsel favor
federal court. Statistics further suggest that the use of summary
adjudication in federal court is substantial and increasing. Statistics from
1997 through 2012 regarding civil insurance cases in federal court
consistently indicate that approximately 73% to 79% of cases terminated
by court action were terminated before pretrial.53 Further, the percentage of
cases actually decided by trial was both minuscule and declining. In 1997,
3.7% of insurance cases were decided by trial (jury and non-jury). The
percentage resolved by trial stayed above 3% until 2002, when it dropped
to 2.5%. The percentage stayed above 2% but below 3% until 2007, when
it dropped to 1.6%.54 Since 2007, the percentage of insurance cases decided
by trial has stayed below 2%, ranging from 1.2% to 1.8%.55
These percentage differences may seem insignificant, but they
represent a substantial decline in the number of insurance cases proceeding
to trial in the federal courts. The raw numbers for several years between
1997 and 2013 tell the story.

52

The complaint must include sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
53
Director’s Report, supra note 43, at Table C–4.
54
Id.
55
Id.
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Insurance Cases Resolved by Jury Trial in Federal Court56
Year
1997
2003
2007
2011
2012
2013

Non-Jury Trials
83
72
47
37
34
42

Jury Trials
161
104
97
94
95
90

Total Trials
244
176
144
131
129
132

Therefore, there is simply no doubt that the federal courts are very
likely to dispose of insurance cases before trial, and the chances of a case
going to trial is exceedingly low. From 2011 to 2013, approximately 130
insurance cases per year went to trial in the entire federal court system, a
very low number.
B.

SUBSTANTIVE PREFERENCE FOR FEDERAL COURT

Insurance companies prefer federal court for substantive reasons as
well.
Fifty-three-and-one-half percent (53.5%) of defense counsel
responding to the Miller survey “cited the likelihood of a more favorable
federal court legal ruling.”57 Although the substantive differences were
more difficult to specify than the procedural advantages of federal court,
defense counsel were clear in their perception: “The research findings
indicate that some areas of state law are not consistently followed by
federal court rulings.”58 Survey responses indicated that federal courts may
56

Director’s Report, supra, note 43, at Table C–4; DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF.
OF U.S. COURTS, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS Table C–4 (2012); DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S.
COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS Table C–4 (2011); DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S.
COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS C–4 (2007); DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS,
2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS Table C–4 (2003); DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS,
1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS Table C–4 (1997).
57
58

Miller, supra note 42, at 417.
Id. at 437.
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make their own predictions of state law and ignore precedent from
intermediate state appellate courts.59 The survey concluded that although no
conclusions about the pervasiveness of the problem could be reached, “the
large proportion of attorneys in the study who anticipated different rulings
of law in state court points to the need for more definitive study.”60
Thus, the reason why plaintiffs and defendants battle so fiercely
over a state or federal forum is simple: despite Erie, federal courts are
perceived, particularly by defense counsel, to decide procedural and
substantive issues of state law differently than state courts. Statistics
validate the perception that federal judges are very likely to dispose of
cases without a trial. The risk of proceeding to trial for an insurer in
federal court, which has been small for years, is now almost non-existent.
IV.

CONSEQUENCES

The substantive misapplication of state law has serious
consequences that directly undermine the fundamental principle of
federalism underlying Erie, namely, the state courts’ ability to decide and
shape state law. Moreover, perceived differences between the way federal
and state courts decide state law encourage insurers and other parties to
seek a federal forum, further undermining Erie’s policy against forum
shopping.
A.

DEPRIVATION OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS

An incorrect Erie guess deprives a litigant of substantive rights. In
the insurance context, the consequences are particularly obvious. An
insured denied coverage based on an incorrect interpretation of state law
loses, in a first party property case, the right to recover for a loss. In a
liability case, the consequences may be even more severe, because the
insured loses both the benefit of an insurer-provided defense as well as
indemnity for any settlement or judgment. Further, insurance may provide
the only means of recovery for the plaintiff.
Further, the loss is generally without any possible recourse. As
observed by Judge Calabresi of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit: “In such a situation, the party who lost in federal court has
59
60

Id. at 440.
Id.
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been unjustly denied her state-law rights, and often has been left with no
means of effective redress.”61 In discussing a case in which a litigant was
deprived of ownership of a valuable painting because of an incorrect Erie
guess, Judge Calabresi noted that the plaintiff was deprived of her property
“not because of any decision by the highest court of New York, but rather
because of the will of the federal courts.”62
The ramifications of an incorrect Erie guess, particularly in
insurance coverage cases, often extend far beyond the lack of redress in a
single case. Because the ruling becomes persuasive precedent, it is likely
to be applied multiple times until the state’s highest court issues a contrary
ruling. Accordingly, a single mistake may be repeated again and again.
Because insurance policies are typically written on common policy forms,
the potential for repeated errors in coverage litigation is acute. 63
B.

ENCOURAGING FORUM SHOPPING

When a federal court decides an unsettled question of state law, it
potentially undermines principles of federalism.
This includes
circumventing the right of a state’s highest court to determine questions of
state law. In the context of discussing a hypothetical product liability case,
Judge Calabresi observed:
If the federal court treats the plaintiff more favorably than
the state tribunal would, then the plaintiff always files in
federal court; similarly any departure in the manufacturer’s
favor leads the defendant to remove any suit filed in state
court. In either case, the state loses the ability to develop
or restate the principles that it believes should govern the
category of cases.64
61

McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting). Judge Calabresi’s dissent provides rare analysis and commentary from
a member of the federal judiciary on this important subject.
62
Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
63
As noted previously, this is exactly what happened in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit
regarding coverage for construction defects. See supra notes 19–21 and
accompanying text.
64
McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 158.
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This is no small matter, particularly in light of the discussion above
showing that federal courts routinely decide unsettled questions of state
law, and often decide them incorrectly.
Further, contrary to Erie’s intent, federal court decisions on
unsettled questions of state law encourage forum shopping. As noted in the
quotation from Judge Calabresi above, it really does not matter which party
the decision favors, as one side or the other will be encouraged to forum
shop in federal court.
For insurance coverage cases, experience and statistics show, as
discussed above, that the insured will usually wish to proceed in state court
and the insurer will normally wish to proceed in federal court. Further, as a
general proposition and as demonstrated above, federal judges have always
been likely, and are becoming even more likely, to rule on motions to
dismiss or for summary judgment, resulting in a minuscule chance for an
insurance coverage case to proceed to trial.
Accordingly, when there is an insurance coverage dispute, and
there is diversity jurisdiction, the insurer may well race to file first in
federal court. If the insured files first in state court, the insurer will often
still have the option to remove the case to federal court. To be sure, there
may be jurisdictions in which the opposite situation prevails, and the
insured would prefer to proceed in federal court and the insurer in state
court. In such instances, the insured can use the same procedural
techniques to maneuver the case to federal court.65 But recognizing this
possibility merely highlights the fundamental point: In all cases in which
diversity exists and there is an unsettled question of state law, one party is
likely to try to maneuver the case to federal court to achieve a different
substantive result.
V.

POSSIBLE REMEDIES
A.

ELIMINATING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

One obvious solution would simply be to eliminate diversity
jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction is controversial, and there have long
been calls to eliminate it. In the past several decades, serious legislative

65

28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012).
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efforts were made to abolish diversity jurisdiction.66 Most notably, in 1990,
a specially appointed federal study committee recommended repealing
diversity jurisdiction in all but a limited number of situations on the basis
that no type of jurisdiction had a “weaker claim” on federal judicial
resources, and because eliminating diversity jurisdiction would reduce the
caseload of the federal courts.67 Predictably, the committee’s
recommendation met with substantial resistance, including among the bar.68
Efforts to limit or curtail diversity jurisdiction have failed, and, as
Professor Underwood put it, “Congress chose a different path.”69 Most
recently, Congress expanded the scope of federal jurisdiction through the
adoption of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”),70 which
expands federal court jurisdiction to cover certain class action lawsuits in
the absence of complete diversity.71
Regardless of the recent change in political fortunes, the
elimination of diversity jurisdiction would seem, under almost any
circumstance, to be highly improbable. Any such effort would be strongly
opposed by insurers, big business, and the defense bar. In short, little basis

66

The House of Representatives voted twice to abolish diversity jurisdiction in
the late 1970s, even though it never reached the Senate. James M. Underwood, The
Late, Great Diversity Jurisdiction, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 199 (2007)
[hereinafter “Underwood”]. Underwood’s article provides a comprehensive and
entertaining recitation of the ebb and flow of support or diversity jurisdiction. See also
L. Lynn Hogue, Law in a Parallel Universe: Erie’s Betrayal, Diversity Jurisdiction,
Georgia Conflicts of Laws Questions in Contracts Cases in the Eleventh Circuit, and
Certification Reform, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 531, 533–35 (1995).
67
H.R. REP. NO. 5381, at 63 (1990).
68
See Report of the N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers' Ass’n Comm. on the Fed. Courts on
the Recommendation of the Fed. Courts Study Comm. to Abolish Diversity
Jurisdiction Adopted by the Bd. of Dirs. of the N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, 158
F.R.D. 185 (1995) [hereinafter “New York Committee Report”]. The New York
Committee Report contains a measured but very detailed criticism of the
Committee Report, including a survey of federal judges that casts doubt upon the
Committee Report’s underlying assumptions.
69
Underwood, supra note 66, at 201.
70
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1711–1714 (2012).
71
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
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exists for challenging Professor Baker’s observation that “no one should
expect it to be abolished in an existing lifetime plus twenty-one years.”72
Further, the expansion of federal court jurisdiction suggests that the
federal courts will necessarily be facing an even greater number of state
law questions. Thus, the question remains how to achieve the goals and
requirements of Erie. Fortunately, a ready solution exists, although not in
the way it is currently utilized.
B.

USE OF AVAILABLE CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES

When a federal court in a diversity case faces an uncertain question
of state law, it currently has three possible choices. First, the court can
predict how the state’s highest court would rule, often leading to
unsatisfactory results as discussed above. Second, the court can abstain
from deciding the question under the Pullman abstention doctrine, which is
seldom applicable.73 Third, if available, the court can certify the question to
the state’s highest court under statutory certification procedures. Almost
all states now have certification statutes, so the opportunity to certify exists
in most cases.74
72

THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 190 (1994).
73
See generally R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
The Pullman abstention doctrine generally provides that, “if [there are] unsettled
questions of state law in a case that may make it unnecessary to decide a federal
constitutional question, the federal court should abstain until the state court has
resolved the state questions.” 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 295 (3d ed. 2007).
74
Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to
Federal Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 159 n.13 (2003)
(compiling statues); see also JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF
STATE LAW 1, 15–17 (American Judicature Society ed., 1995) (listing 43 states as of
1995). Cochran lists Arkansas, North Carolina, and New Jersey as not having
certification procedures. However, New Jersey adopted a statute permitting
certification effective in 2000, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:12A-1 (West 1999), and Arkansas
adopted certification in 2002, see Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-8; Longview Prod. Co. v.
Dubberly, 352 Ark. 207, 208 (2003) (“Rule 6–8 was adopted in 2002 pursuant to
Section 2(D)(3) of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution: ‘The Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States which may be exercised pursuant to Supreme Court rule’”). It
appears that North Carolina is the only state that has not adopted a certification
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Florida was the first state to adopt a certification statute in 1945.
Over fifty years ago in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd., Justice
Frankfurter lauded the “rare foresight” of the Florida legislature by
providing a mechanism for “authoritatively determining unresolved state
law involved in federal litigation by a statute which permits a federal court
to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court of
Florida for its decision.”75
Since Clay, the Supreme Court has enthusiastically embraced the
use of the certification procedure in a number of cases.76 The Court has
stressed: “Through certification of novel or unsettled questions of state law
for authoritative answers by a state’s highest court, a federal court may
save ‘time, energy, and resources and hel[p] build a cooperative judicial
federalism.’”77 The Court has observed that a “question of state law usually
can be resolved definitively . . . if a certification procedure is available and
is successfully utilized.”78

provision. Eric Eisenberg, A Divine Comity: Certification (at Last) in North Carolina,
58 DUKE L.J. 69, 71 (2008) (“North Carolina remains the only state never to have
enacted such a procedure, putting it behind the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam.”) (footnotes omitted); see Shakira Robinson,
Right, But for the Wrong Reasons: How A Certified Question to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina Could Have Alleviated Conflicting Views and Brought Clarity to
North Carolina State Law, 34 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 230, 230 (2012) (“Unconstitutional
or dogmatic, North Carolina is the only state that has never enacted a procedure by
which a federal court could certify a question of state law to its state Supreme Court”).
As noted by Eisenberg, although Missouri has adopted a statute permitting
certification, the Missouri Supreme Court has refused to accept certified questions on
the ground they are not within its jurisdiction under the Missouri Constitution. See
Grantham v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr., No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. July
13, 1990).
75
Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
76
E.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 398 (1988)
(certifying questions to Supreme Court of Virginia); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416
U.S. 386, 395 (1974) (remanding for consideration of certification to Supreme
Court of Florida).
77
Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43, 77 (1997) (quoting
Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 391).
78
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 237 n.4 (1991).
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THE PROBLEM: LACK OF UNIFORM APPLICATION OF
CERTIFICATION

Although the Supreme Court has endorsed the use of certification
procedures when available, it has never established definitive standards for
certification. Rather, the Court has stated that the decision to certify is one
of discretion, and “not obligatory.”79 However, the Court has not provided
guidance to the federal courts on the factors to be considered in exercising
their discretion. As one District Court judge observed: “The Supreme
Court has never indicated the necessary conditions before a court can resort
to certification.”80
In the absence of definitive guidance from the Supreme Court,
there remains considerable conflict among the Circuits in the approach to
be taken in certifying questions for review. Some courts take a hospitable
view, noting the Supreme Court’s enthusiastic support for certification.81
For example among this group, the courts certify simply when “[t]here is
no controlling precedent to be found in the decisions.”82 The Eighth Circuit
certified “because of the unsettled nature of Nebraska law on this issue and
because a determination of this issue could be dispositive of this case.”83
Conversely, other courts take a very restrictive view. The Second
Circuit resorts to certification “sparingly” on the theory that its job is to
predict how the Court of Appeals of New York would rule.84 Another court
adopted a restrictive six-part test.85 Some courts seem irritated with the
very suggestion of certification, particularly after they have decided an
unsettled question of state law.86 Other courts appear to have charted a

79

Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 390–391 (certification “not obligatory” and
matter of discretion, but helps build a “cooperative judicial federalism”).
80
Fiat Motors of N. Am. Inc. v. Mayor of Wilmington, 619 F. Supp. 29, 33
(D.C. Del. 1985).
81
E.g., Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 903 F.2d 1014 (5th
Cir. 1990).
82
Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 113 F.3d 1285, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
83
Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Mem’l Hosp., 701 F.2d 1266, 1267 (8th Cir.
1983).
84
E.g., Runner v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 568 F.3d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 2009).
85
Zimmer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 454 F. Supp. 2d 839, 861 (S.D. Iowa 2006).
86
One court has remarked:
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middle ground: “While we apply judgment and restraint before certifying,
however, we will nonetheless employ the device in circumstances where
the question before us (1) may be determinative of the case at hand and (2)
is sufficiently novel that we feel uncomfortable attempting to decide it
without further guidance.”87
Notably, some courts have been inconsistent in considering
certification in their own rulings. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has
stated both that (1) a question should be certified if there is “any doubt” as
to state law on an issue88 and (2) that it will “exercise discretion and
restraint in deciding to certify questions to state courts.”89 The Eleventh
Circuit recently recited the “any doubt” test, but also inconsistently stated
that certification decisions must be made with “restraint.”90 Even more
recently, the Eleventh Circuit appeared to abandon the “any doubt” test,
noting that certification should be used with “restraint,” but declared that
“truly debatable” issues of state law should be certified.91 It is thus
impossible to ascertain any clear standard for certification in this court.
Certification is not to be routinely invoked whenever a
federal court is presented with an unsettled question of state law.
Late requests for certification are rarely granted by this court and
are generally disapproved, particularly when the district court
has already ruled. Filing a motion to certify after an adverse
ruling, as was done in this case, is not favored.
Potter v. Synerlink Corp., No.08-CV-674-GKF-TLW, 2012 WL 2886015, at *1
(N.D. Okla. July 13, 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The
approach advocated by Potter may be questioned, as it essentially asks advocates
to assume the federal court will make a mistake and to request certification before
ruling. An advocate may, with some understanding, be reluctant to make such a
suggestion for strategic reasons. In any event, a refusal to grant a legitimate request
for certification based solely on timing seems to undermine the basic reason for the
process: a correct determination of state law by the court authorized to have the
final and definitive word.
87
Pino v. United States, 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007).
88
Colonial Props., Inc. v. Vogue Cleaners, Inc., 77 F.3d 384, 387 (11th Cir.
1996).
89
Escareno v. Noltina Crucible & Refractory Corp., 139 F.3d 1456, 1461
(11th Cir. 1998).
90
Royal Capital Dev., LLC v. Md. Cas. Co., 659 F.3d 1050, 1054–1055 (11th
Cir. 2011).
91
Ruderman ex rel. Schwartz v. Wash. Nat. Ins. Corp., 671 F.3d 1208, 1212
(11th Cir. 2012).
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THE NEED FOR CLEAR STANDARDS FOR CERTIFICATION

Use of the certification process clearly fosters the policies
underlying Erie, and promotes, as the Supreme Court has said, a
“cooperative judicial federalism.”92 As currently practiced, however,
certification procedures often serve only to add a further level of
uncertainty in deciding unsettled questions of state law. Although some
use of certification is better than none, the reality is that the availability of
certification is dependent upon the court in which the case is pending, and,
in many cases, seems to turn on nothing more than how the judicial winds
are blowing on a particular day.
The result is that, while some litigants receive the constitutional
benefits of certification, others do not. Equally important, a state’s highest
court is often deprived of its constitutional prerogative to determine the law
of the state. Fortunately, the status quo need not continue. The best
solution would be a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, establishing
liberal and consistent standards for certification. Even in the absence of
Supreme Court guidance, however, lower federal courts can and should
adopt consistent principles designed to foster the use of available
certification procedures consistent with the constitutional mandate of Erie.
E.

TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONALLY CONSISTENT APPROACH TO
CERTIFICATION

A constitutionally consistent approach toward certification should
be far more uniform than is currently practiced, but will not be completely
uniform. The guiding principle of federalism is that certification must be
consistent with the requirements of the state certification statute.
Obviously, if a state has mandated certain requirements, they must be
followed, and state certification procedures, although generally consistent
in their broad outline, vary somewhat. Some procedures permit only the
United States Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeal to
certify. Others permit United States District Courts to certify as well.
Some statutes establish additional requirements.93 Whatever state statutory
requirements exist, the first principle is that they should be satisfied before
a question is certified. That said, states that do not currently permit District
92
93

Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239-240 (1991).
GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 74, at 15–17.

482

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 21.2

Courts to certify should strongly consider amending their statutes.
Certification by a District Court permits the parties to obtain a definitive
determination of unsettled law early in the litigation, thus promoting
efficiency.
Second, subject to state requirements, there should be a liberal
presumption in favor of certifying unsettled questions of state law. This
approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s oft-stated enthusiasm for
certification, not to mention Erie’s core principle of federalism. It is also
hardly radical. As noted above, some federal courts have followed this
approach. Further, this approach is also consistent with the states’ own
endorsement of the certification mechanism as demonstrated by the nearly
unanimous adoption of the process. In the insurance context, certification
has been used—although haphazardly and pursuant to different standards—
to resolve many unsettled state insurance questions.94
Third, the certifying court should consider whether a particular
area of law, or a particular question, has led other courts to reach differing
conclusions. As discussed above, the insurance coverage cases provide a
particular example of such an area. If so, this factor will further support
certification.
Fourth, the certifying court should make a clear determination that
the controlling legal question has not been decided by the state’s highest
court, and it should clearly articulate the controlling question of state law.
In most instances, this can and will be done without difficulty. In other
cases, however, the case may turn not on a disputed or undecided
substantive legal principle but upon the admissibility of evidence or other
non-substantive issues. In such instances, certification might not be
appropriate.
Fifth, the certifying court may wish to consider whether the legal
principle has potential significance beyond the current case. In most
instances, it is likely that there will be future ramifications. This is
particularly true in the area of insurance coverage, because policies are
written on standardized forms, virtually assuring that the same question
will arise in multiple cases. Nevertheless, there may be cases that are so
unique that certification would lend little to the development of state law,
and, in such circumstances, certification may be declined. Even then,
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however, consideration of the substantive rights of the litigants may favor
certification.95
This approach will foster the principles of federalism that underlie
Erie. It should decrease incentives for forum shopping between state and
federal courts in the same jurisdiction. It will help prevent litigants from
being deprived of substantive rights under state law through incorrect Erie
guesses. Perhaps most importantly, it will ensure that the court entitled to
make the final determination of state law gets a fair chance to make it.
It may be questioned whether these principles should apply only to
insurance coverage litigation or generally. My view is that they should
apply generally, because the policies underlying Erie apply generally. That
said, the principles are particularly applicable to insurance coverage
litigation, and if consistently applied, almost all unsettled insurance
coverage issues would qualify for certification.
VI.

A POSTSCRIPT: “WHY” REALLY DOES NOT MATTER

An early draft of this Article attempted to explain why federal
often courts seem to decide insurance coverage cases differently than state
courts; specifically, whether there is some identifiable difference in
procedural approach or substantive doctrine that explained the divergence.
At the end of the day, it was simply not possible to determine any definitive
reasons why federal courts often decide insurance coverage cases
differently from state courts, even though the evidence strongly suggests
that they do.
One thing, however, is clear: different states often reach
diametrically differing conclusions regarding the meaning and application
of insurance policy forms.96 Accordingly, when a federal court faces an
unsettled question of state insurance law, there may well be conflicting
precedent from other jurisdictions based on fundamentally different
approaches. Thus, when a federal court chooses one line of precedent in
the face of substantial precedent to the contrary, it increases the probability
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of an incorrect Erie guess, because the state’s highest court might well
choose the reasoning in the other cases.
The fact that a federal court may choose to follow one line of
conflicting precedent over another on an unsettled question is not, in the
abstract, “wrong,” if the federal court were left to its own devices. The
problem, however, is that Erie does not leave federal courts to their own
devices, but rather directs them to follow state law, even if they believe
another approach would be preferable. The state’s highest court has the
last word, or at any rate, is supposed to have it.
Accordingly, rather than focusing on how they would decide the
question, the federal courts should instead focus on using certification
procedures to allow the state’s highest court to exercise its constitutional
prerogative to make the decision.
Such an approach fosters the
“cooperative judicial federalism”97 on which Erie is based, and renders
moot the question of why federal courts would decide the issue differently.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although Erie has been the law of the land for over seventy years, its
constitutional underpinnings are often forgotten. The fundamental principle
underlying Erie is that the highest court of a state must have the final say in
interpreting and determining state law. In spite of this principle, federal courts
routinely make guesses on state law insurance questions, and frequently come
up with the wrong answers. Incorrect Erie guesses not only affect the
substantive rights of litigants, they undermine the constitutionally mandated
prerogative of state courts to determine state law.
Certification statutes provide a readily available remedy in
virtually every state. Although certification has been widely praised by the
United States Supreme Court, its use in practice varies greatly, with some
courts liberally granting certification, and others only in exceptional
circumstances. As a result, the best available mechanism for implementing
Erie’s principles has been unevenly applied. The approach advocated in
this Article will bring greater uniformity and greater availability to
certification procedures, and will also help eliminate forum shopping, with
the ultimate result being that the principles of federalism underlying Erie
are properly applied.
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